Abstract: While New Historicism is spreading into other disciplines and continues to produce valuable studies, Greenblatt’s politics, methodology and scholarly standards have come increasingly under attack. This essay endeavours to review and contextualize the various contributions to this debate in Critical Self-Fashioning: Stephen Greenblatt and the New Historicism, an anthology edited by Jürgen Pieters (Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Peter Lang, 1999). Among other things, it is remarkable that, in this interesting anthology, the role of the imagination in constructing the past and the importance of the aesthetic dimension in the reception of a literary work, which has been so sadly neglected by the non-poetic branch of New Historicism, once more enter the field of critical discussion.

“Natürlich gebrauchen wir die Wörter mit unserem Wissen von den Dingen, meinen damit aber die Dinge selbst und nicht die begrenzten Kenntnisse, die wir von ihnen haben.” This remark by Eugenio Coseriu (201) may serve to indicate the reason why, after the obsessive concern of poststructuralism with texts as mere systems of signs without an assured access to the referent, a return to the study of texts in their social context was inevitable. Stephen Greenblatt (1982) coined the term ‘New Historicism’ for his own endeavour and that of a group of literary critics and cultural historians who approach the study of history with a poststructuralist awareness that meanings are social constructs and with a Foucauldian sensibility to the fact that ‘knowledge,’ far from always being a liberating force, often enough serves the purpose of social control by conceptualising reality in a manner which upholds power structures in society. The New Historicists claim to trace out and articulate suppressed ‘other voices’ and challenge the traditional literary canon without constructing a new one. They relish to surprise the reader by showing unthought-of connections between apparently minor episodes or anecdotes and the larger course of what traditional historians have constructed as ‘public history.’

Although Stephen Greenblatt, the leading figure of the movement, prefers to call New Historicism a practice rather than a theory, he has made the major contributions to the development of a number of key-concepts. There has been very little of a discussion among New Historicists themselves, Louis Montrose being the only other practitioner who has written a repeatedly anthologized essay on theory. Nearly all the impulses for the heated debate on New Historicism came
from the outside, partly from scholars who were sympathetic to the movement (Howard, Gallagher), but also from scholars who were hostile to it (Pechter, Liu, Vickers). In a perceptive article, Alan Liu shows that Greenblatt projects his own dissatisfaction with the Reagan Administration on the Tudor period without considering the pros and cons of his anachronistic procedure. Brian Vickers deplores that the New Historicists abandon all efforts to achieve anything in the direction of a ‘disinterested’ inquiry into the past or to enter into a hermeneutic self-reflection about their ‘Erkenntnisinteresse.’ Unabashed, they set out to appropriate the past, “having an ideology that needs to assert itself [and] prove its validity as a system” (Vickers, 223). Vickers and Tom McAlindon (1995a) reject Greenblatt’s notion of omnipresent ‘Machiavellian’ surveillance in Elizabethan society as well as his implicit assumption that there was a whole host of “disaffected subjects,” who were supposedly cajoled by writers and dramatists into subservience to the government, after subversive thoughts and emotions had temporarily been given vent in transitional passages of the texts. In “Invisible Bullets,” Greenblatt (1988) assumes that, since the Tudor period saw the dissolution of feudalism and the rise of the ‘modern state,’ its government must have been highly oppressive. His attempt to enlist Thomas Harriot’s account of the Virginia Plantation and Thomas Harman’s A Caveat for Common Cursitors as evidence for such a view is utterly misguided. In another article of the same year, McAlindon (1995b) also challenges what may be called the English branch of New Historicism, the more Marxist and Raymond-Williams-oriented school of Cultural Materialism, by criticising Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries for ascribing a much later philosophical and political radicalism to a wide range of Jacobean tragedies. Since “so much of New Historical writing cannot ever forget the present and its discontents” (Vickers, 222-23), it differs widely from the Old Historicism described (and criticised) by Friedrich Meinecke, which emphasised that each epoch had its own values and therefore could not be used as in humanist historiography to teach morals to later generations. The whole question of moral universalism vs. historical relativism remains unconsidered by the New Historicists. Brook Thomas (Veeser, 182-203) and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (Veeser, 214) questioned whether New Historicism was historical at all. Moreover, Vickers and McAlindon (1995a) launched a devastating attack on Greenblatt’s scholarly standards, blaming him for the incoherence of his arguments, his inaccurate use of sources, unargued assertions, “irrelevant contextualisation” (Vickers, 240, 238) and his penchant for generalizations on slender evidence.

Despite these passionate and largely well-founded attacks, there is a widening interest in New Historicism. In a deep-searching study, Claire Colebrook (1998) investigates the special features of New Historicism in comparison with the construction of literary history in other approaches since the 1950s. Moritz Baßler’s New Historicism (2001) offers the German reader a selection of New Historicist essays and considers why German philology was so slow to respond to this movement although there has been a long and respectable tradition of historical
scholarship in this country. In *Moderne Literaturtheorie und antike Texte: Eine Einführung*, Thomas A. Schmitz (2002) dedicates one chapter of his review of new directions in literary theory to New Historicism, cautiously envisaging (rather limited) areas in which he believes that this approach could prove useful in classical philology. The purpose of our paper is to investigate in what manner Jürgen Pieters’s collection of essays delivered at a conference at Ghent in Belgium in April 1997, contributes to the widening reception and discussion of New Historicism. Special attention will be paid to areas in which, because of similarities and differences in their approach, the contributors could enter into a discussion with each other.

Two of the articles in the volume take up the defence of Greenblatt against charges of “arbitrary connectedness” (Cohen). David Schalkwyk emphasises the similarity of Greenblatt’s approach to Clifford Geertz’s ‘thick description’ in his renowned anthropological studies of Balinese culture. According to Schalkwyk, Greenblatt’s procedure is characterised by a synchronic investigation of culture, which amounts to a mapping of conceptual connections, instead of a search for causal explanations. According to Schalkwyk, Geertz and Greenblatt do not reduce distance and wonder by integrating the studied phenomenon into the storehouse of ‘secure knowledge.’ Schalkwyk maintains that Geertz’s ways of establishing synchronic connections is derived from Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance as a way of describing related cultural phenomena. Unfortunately, Schalkwyk does not show in what manner the concept of family resemblance can be made operable in practical criticism of literary texts or in cultural studies. At first sight, the concept of family resemblance looks very promising, for instance when applied to the theory of literary genres, since it allows for variety within a framework of resemblances between members of the same genre. But once we realise that designations of degrees of kinship such as brother, sister, uncle, aunt etc. are hardly suited to classify the members of a literary genre, the concept of family resemblance looks more like a dead end than a new opening for further research.

Sonja Laden maintains that, in Greenblatt, coherence is established by poetic forms of representation such as the use of anecdotes, metaphors, and chiastic connections (cf. “the forms of power and the power of forms,” Greenblatt, 1982). Both Laden’s and Schalkwyk’s articles suffer from a misguided conception about ‘normal’ procedures in literary criticism: they maintain that traditional literary criticism is characterised by a search for causal explanations. They disregard Wilhelm Dilthey’s famous distinction between ‘understanding’ as a method in the humanities and ‘explanation’ as a method in natural science. No doubt, Laden’s approach to Greenblatt’s form of representation as ‘poetic’ is in tune with Greenblatt’s own view of New Historicism as a form of ‘cultural poetics.’ But this does by no means justify that she restricts herself entirely to describing aspects of Greenblatt’s approach without submitting them to a scrutiny of whether or not these procedures are conducive to the goals of literary or cultural criticism.
Another area for a debate between the contributors to the volume, left unused by the editor, is the question of the role of imagination in the scholarly construction of images of the past. Schalkwyk shares Geertz’s view that empathy is not necessary for the study of foreign cultures. No doubt, in poststructuralist theories there is next to no room left for empathy as a mode of the imagination, for the universe is conceived of as an archive of discourses. Ann Rigney, however, emphasises that empathy and imagination are greatly required in the business of the cultural historian. She maintains that poststructuralist approaches to history resemble those of the Romantics in various ways: like Wordsworth and Scott, the New Historicists endeavour to recapture the past “as it was experienced by contemporaries, particularly those on the margins of society, who did not subsequently get to write the official record” (24). Moreover, the Romantics preferred an evocative use of a deliberately fragmented style to the system-building of the Enlightenment. In a perceptive analysis of Walter Scott’s “Lay of the Last Minstrel,” Rigney also shows that Scott was particularly interested in older forms of poetry since the imitation of former epistemological modes of representing and interpreting ‘reality’ helped to evoke the past. For Rigney, the New Historicists’ method is characterised by the endeavour to enter into a dialogue with the dead by the use of historical ‘sources’ as springboards for the imagination. One may indeed wonder how Schalkwyk and Geertz arrive at an understanding of foreign cultures after a supposed total exclusion of empathy. Nevertheless, an awareness of the strangeness of a studied phenomenon, as desired by Schalkwyk, is no doubt highly conducive to further a spirit of investigation. In fact, both capacities of empathy and distantiation are required in historical research.

While Rigney maintains that the New Historicists make practical use of their imagination and therefore – one should assume – cannot be hostile to aesthetic features of a text, Benjamin Biebuyck deplores that their studies suffer from an utter lack of awareness of the importance of the aesthetic dimension in the reception of a literary work. Aesthetic artefacts are seen by the New Historicists as products of “an underlying or encompassing social development” (174). This has resulted in a total neglect of the cultural impact, which a work of art may have on the dynamics of the social and cultural environment because of its “aesthetic realisation” (175). Biebuyck investigates what opportunities “for a plausible recontextualisation of aesthetic experience” are offered by the otherwise widely divergent historicising approaches of Greenblatt and René Girard. According to Biebuyck, Greenblatt fails to clarify why the sense of ‘wonder’ aroused by a work of art heightens what he calls the ‘resonance’ of a text. Biebuyck distinguishes between two phases in the reading process: the first, the aesthetic phase, is characterised by “a dialectics between the appropriation of fictional reality and the expropriation of one’s personal background.” Citing de Man, Biebuyck maintains that this leads to the reader’s temporary distantiation from the discursive patterns that often enough remain unquestioned in everyday life. The second phase of the reading process is defined as the ‘reception’ or integration of the newly acquired insight into the reader’s system of beliefs and attitudes. Whenever a
Testing Stephen Greenblatt’s New Historicism

reader embarks on this adventure, a text becomes indeed very much ‘part of the empirical world’ and discloses “its modest, mostly negative, social potential” (179). Biebuyck conceives aesthetic practice as “historically (and geographically) variable,” since it is “a rule-governed habitus which is the product of a process of culturalisation.” Nevertheless, for Biebuyck, ‘aesthetic suspension’ (192) is a constant in the reading of all texts that are perceived as fictional. Greenblatt is criticised for disrupting the two phases of the reading process in a self-contradictory manner: although he claims that ‘wonder’ as aesthetic experience increases social ‘resonance,’ he also maintains that it “blocks out all circumambient images, stills all murmuring voices” (Greenblatt: 1990, 179). Thus, strangely enough, for Greenblatt, the aesthetic experience does not further, but obstructs the appreciation of a work of art. In fact, Greenblatt’s remark contradicts his earlier view that “great art is an extraordinarily sensitive register of the complex struggles and harmonies of culture” (1980, 5). By contrast, in Girard’s history of the evolution of a non-sacrificial world-view, in which scapegoats are no longer put to death in reality, aesthetic experience acquires an important cathartic function in the renunciation of communal violence: it “wards off the dangers of collective reciprocity and destructuration, since it presupposes individuality, inwardness, isolation, alienation from one’s cultural background, and depersonalisation, which makes the stimulated conflict harmless (on a social level)” (189). Thus in Girard, the aesthetic experience of a work of art is far from a mere additional gratification in the reading process, nor is it an impediment to the appreciation of its social relevance, for it alters the reception fundamentally in a liberating and civilising manner. Biebuyck reminds the New Historists that they could and should learn something from a confrontation with Girard.

It is disconcerting that New Historists are so reluctant to see their own method in historical perspective. Greenblatt introduced the term ‘New Historicism’ in opposition to the unhistorical approach of New Criticism and to positivist studies of history. He ignored the history of Old Historicism (Meinecke). Studies dealing with New Historicism from a historical point of view – including Claire Colebrook’s – start as late as the 1950s. It is therefore very commendable that Rigney’s and Biebuyck’s articles considerably expand the historical perspective. As already indicated, another area attracting much attention in debates on New Historicism ever since Liu’s seminal article is Greenblatt’s containment thesis implying that subversive elements in Elizabethan literature and culture “serve to consolidate rather than disrupt the apparatus of English power” (Harris, 167). The articles by Jonathan Gil Harris and Koenraad Geldof make important contributions to this debate. Harris shows that George F. Kennan, the initiator of the US containment policy after the Second World War, held a very similar view. But more important, Greenblatt adopts the paradigm of modern functionalist anthropology of Durkheim and Parsons maintaining that “pathological behaviour can contribute to rather than disrupt ‘the normal operation of the social functions’” (158). Furthermore, Harris points out that Greenblatt has difficulties similar to that of functionalist sociology in accounting for social
Eckhard Auberlen / Adolfo Murguía

change, since every deviance is seen as merely helping society to pull together and contain subversive forces. Lacking other means of accounting for historical change, the functionalist anthropologists posit “the encounter between ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ cultures as paradigmatic of social upheaval and transformation” (163). According to Harris, Greenblatt likewise maintains that “social change is, in effect, a contagion contracted from an external, invading foreign body,” as “European culture infects, literally and metaphorically, that of the New World” (163). Shrewd as Harris’s analysis undoubtedly is, he fails to point out that Greenblatt and Durkheim hold opposite views concerning the idea of a healthy state of society. For Durkheim and Parsons, ‘deviance’ contributes to the ‘health of the social organism,’ whereas the contribution of subversive voices to containment policies of the ruling class is something greatly annoying and frustrating for Greenblatt.

Geldof blames Greenblatt’s containment thesis for being “an iron cage where no one really escapes from the effects of the cunning of power” (211). He compares it to Adorno and Horkheimer’s pessimistic thesis of a self-defeating ‘dialectics of the Enlightenment.’ Adorno and Horkheimer reject the fervent belief of the philosophers of the Enlightenment that, by the use of critical reason, humanity will ultimately liberate itself from its self-imposed chains. They see this optimism as ill-founded and replace it by a “gloomy vision of modernity as total domination by instrumental and formal reason” (199). According to Geldof, Greenblatt is even more of a pessimist because he does not share Adorno and Horkheimer’s belief in the power of literature to overcome the alienation by a ‘negation of the negation’ and a liberating ‘excess.’ In contrast to Greenblatt, Geldof does not believe that an all-pervasive manipulation of discourses in the service of containment is possible. He views society “as a complex and ambiguous field of power and counter-power, of discourse and counter-discourse” (203). The many spaces in between, which Homi K. Bhabha calls the ‘Third Space of enunciation,’ provide sufficient potential for social change and liberation from centralised control. Literature is particularly suited to explore these gaps and problematic areas. This, of course, does not mean that it is always engaged in this kind of pursuit. Greenblatt may indeed be criticised for seeing subversion in all likely and unlikely places and then ascribe its articulation to a desire to contain it. But there are texts which do support containment policies, as for example the depiction of Shylock as a usurer who is condemned for the breaking of taboos of economic morality at a time when not only Jews were inclined to break them and when the collapse of traditional morality caused considerable anxiety. Greenblatt’s paradigm of containment literature should certainly not be applied to all Elizabethan texts or to all literature, but it enriches the scale of prototypical texts formulating attitudes to social change such as conservative texts, escapist texts, revolutionary texts etc. Whether or not the application of the Greenblatt thesis is justified must be decided in each individual case.

At first sight, Nadia Lie’s article on the problematic identity of the author of La Celestina seems to be out of place in a volume containing New Historicist
Testing Stephen Greenblatt’s New Historicism

But it is summarized and discussed here since its accidental inclusion may draw attention to blind specks in the New Historicist paradigm. Lie investigates the cryptic manner in which de Rojas, a converted Jew, hides his name by remaining anonymous, but also makes use of an acrostic in a paratext in order to reveal and ‘claim’ his authorship of the major part of La Celestina. Lie criticises Stephen Gilman’s view that Rojas uses the mask of a (rather unconvincing) moralist in order to shield himself from the Inquisition, whereas a different voice, emerging in the paratexts, is viewed rather arbitrarily as revealing “his own deepest feelings” (49). Lie suggests instead that de Rojas’ authorial identity in La Celestina is characterised by cultural hybridity: “there is the orthodox Catholic and there is the former Jew” (51). Thus, for Lie, de Rojas is as much present in the moralistic stance as in the picaresque Celestina, the matchmaker, mediator and hymen-mender, who cites sententiae and creates identities for her customers in which she does not believe herself, but which the various characters think they need in order to survive in society. However this may be, Lie points out that in the final monologue of the play, Pleberio expresses the view that in fact “the only remedy for the suffering of this world is [...] ’not being born,’ being without an origin, [...] dissolve in the flux of Heraclitus” (56). Unfortunately, Lie does not show how this ‘hybrid identity’ reveals itself in the formal structure of the text, as she claims (48). Moreover, she does not use the opportunity to plead for a revision of the rather naive concept of identity underlying most New Historicist studies. Greenblatt’s concept of literature as ‘negotiation’ implies that literature is the result of an interaction between the author and society in which the former acquires institutional facilities from society in acts of appropriation, purchase or symbolic acquisition. The author pays back in catering to the needs of social groups which figure as consumers in the cultural institutions. Although in his early Renaissance Self-Fashioning Greenblatt viewed identity formation as a highly complex social process, his image of the author as depicted in the theoretical introduction to Shakespearean Negotiations seems to be derived from a liberal market economy where self-assured partners enter into a negotiation between equals. Nadia Lie’s image of de Roja’s insecure identity is well-suited to shatter this image of a stable identity. Much of New Historicist criticism is in need of opening itself up to a more multi-faceted view of the genesis and sustenance of identity, as it may be found in postcolonial studies.

In fact, Jan R. Veenstra’s study of the “Bal des Ardents” and the production of the demonic in Medieval culture does not only test the validity of Greenblatt’s concept of a circulation of social energy, as Veenstra announces, but it works with a concept of hybridity in an analysis of exorcism, which belongs to the traditional areas of New Historicist studies: after organising and taking part in a dance of wild men in order to heal his insane brother according to a pagan ritual of exorcism, Louis d’Orleans had thrown a torch at the dancers – an act of aggression, which caused the death of four of the dancers. Veenstra explains the Duke’s ambivalent behaviour as a clash of his pagan belief in the healing force of
the rite, and his Christian demonisation of these pagan rites. Veenstra sees this strange story as the ‘renegotiation’ of an earlier cultural practice, the pagan ritual, in a new cultural context, the Christian struggle for supremacy over the uneradicable continuation of pagan practices. One may add that the behaviour of the Duke of Orleans is as typical of an insecure hybrid identity as the author’s de-centred presence in de Roja’s La Celestina. Veenstra has two other interesting points to make: he reminds us that Johan Huizinga had already used a similar concept of social energy in his study of ‘emotional history’ in his Waning of the Middle Ages. Veenstra also warns against taking “this process of circulation to be universal and ineluctable” (234); there are also those who merely stand aside.

In another essay on exorcism, the feigned madness of Edgar in King Lear, Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen criticises Greenblatt for adopting a stance of scientific scepticism; we should “start reading King Lear in the light of [the] possession tracts” (112) and approach exorcism as a social institution. Moreover, according to van Dijkhuizen, Greenblatt’s study of Harsnett is too much in the spirit of the traditional study of ‘sources.’ A broader notion of intertextuality including ‘quotations without quotation marks’ is required since “anonymous discursive patterns, cultural scenarios and stereotypes crop up in literary texts” (108). The result of van Dijkhuizen’s approach is a more comprehensive and more convincing reading of King Lear than Greenblatt’s since it makes better sense of what in Greenblatt looks like a rather strained argument that the theatricality of exorcism proved that drama was a form of exorcism (Vickers, 239-42; Greenblatt, 1988). Van Dijkhuizen sees the play as a kind of metaphorical ‘exorcism’ of all metaphysical meanings ascribed to the body either in the form of Poor Tom’s being possessed by evil spirits or by the king’s mystical body. Lear does not respond to Edgar’s devil lore at all, but sees Poor Tom as an emblem of ‘unaccommodated man.’ Thus, in King Lear the demonic is not merely unmasked as a fraud as in Harsnett and Greenblatt, but it is reduced to an image of human helplessness and suffering (120). Likewise, nothing remains of the mystical body of the king but the misery of ‘unaccommodated man,’ and finally the royal blood-line is reduced to mere matter, as Lear agonises over the dead body of his daughter in words which ultimately also apply to himself: “Why should a dog, a horse, a rat, have life, / And thou no breath at all?” (V.iii.260). We cannot wholly agree with this total reduction of the king’s mystical body in the play. When Lear claims that he is “every inch a king,” this is not wholly disproved by his madness. His kingship becomes a metaphorical expression of his human dignity, even when all royal insignia are taken away from him and when he is overwhelmed by madness.

Paul Franssen’s essay on the different metaphorical meanings which the pound of flesh acquires for Antonio and Shylock in The Merchant of Venice is wholly dedicated to a practical analysis and worth reading for that purpose. Nevertheless, in our context it is interesting to see what critical premises of New Historicism are brought into action in this interpretation. Franssen applies Greenblatt’s concept of symbolic acquisition. Antonio’s giving his heart away for his friend draws on a rich tradition of schola cordis emblems, but his self-sacrifice is shown as
morally ambiguous, not only because of his attempt to coerce Bassanio’s love, but also in the light of Calvin’s emphatic distinction between the Passion of Christ and the death of human martyrs: fallible human beings should not imitate Christ, but humbly receive Christ’s self-sacrifice for their salvation. For Shylock, the pound of flesh has an entirely different meaning. He desires to punish Antonio for his insults by acquiring the right ‘by due process of law’ to cut a pound of flesh nearest his enemy’s heart like an authorised public executioner. In a Foucauldian sense, “he wants to hijack the state mechanism of instilling terror to acquire power for himself” (100). What Franssen’s essay depicts is an interesting case of a dramatisation of two contrasting symbolic acquisitions attached to the pound of flesh. Indeed, this kind of dramatisation happens often enough in literary texts, but does not figure anywhere as a theoretical concept in Greenblatt’s catalogue of cultural ‘negotiations.’

The articles in this volume focussing on practical analysis show that New Historicism, freed from an obsessive search for subversion and its containment, may lead to important insights. The articles dealing with theoretical issues are undoubtedly an important contribution to debates on New Historicism, but – with the exception of Biebuyck’s reconceptualisation of ‘wonder and resonance’ and Veenstra’s study of a ‘renegotiation’ as a refunctioning of pagan rites – they do not go very far in supplying us with an improved set of tools of critical analysis. New Historicist concepts such as ‘context,’ ‘circulation of social energy’ and ‘negotiations’ remain as vague as ever. Greenblatt’s distinction between ‘appropriation,’ ‘purchase,’ and ‘symbolic acquisition’ as forms of cultural negotiation are insufficient to describe the various ‘hidden transactions’ he investigates himself. The term ‘symbolic acquisition’ is far too comprehensive to serve as an instrument of analysis. So one may hope that the debate will continue and enrich the possibilities of cultural and literary research.

Such a debate should also submit the term ‘New Historicism’ to further scrutiny. Schalkwyk is right in pointing out that Greenblatt’s approach is predominantly synchronic, and Harris shows that New Historicism runs into difficulties when trying to account for change. A more deep-searching comparison between New Historicism and older historicisms would quickly reveal that the term ‘New Historicism’ is a misnomer, since it is a sociologism rather than a historicism. Far from being dedicated to a genetic approach, New Historicism is predominantly focussed on a synchronic study of culture. It is therefore not wholly accidental that its central concept of social energy coincides with Auguste Comte’s ‘énergie sociale.’ For the New Historicists, a poetic text – or, in fact, any text – is embedded in contemporary society in a manner that this society does not merely provide the framework for the genesis of this text, but it produces the energies which are channelled in the text. Thus the text is seen as the product of its immediate surroundings and not as the product of a creative act at a given moment in history. In this sense the New Historicism is no more than a variation of Old Positivism, the problem being not merely that the term ‘New Historicism’ is a misnomer, but that this misnomer suggests that older historical
approaches have become outdated. The diachronic approach still has its value. Many problems of the present are unresolved conflicts of the past. In literary history, patterns of perception and conceptualisation are also often conditioned by earlier works and genres. Writers sometimes feel impeded by tradition and struggle for a new language, or they feel inspired by the past and adapt older forms to respond to urges and needs of the present moment. In fact, a combination of diachronic and synchronic approaches, as practised in ‘Rezeptionsgeschichte’ with its investigation of the various uses of the past for a constantly changing ‘present,’ would better deserve the name of New Historicism.

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